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HORIZONTAL MECHANISMS UNDER DIFFERING IS ORGANIZATION
CONTEXTS
INTRODUCTION
In response to increased environmental complexity and uncertainty, today's managers are
adopting organizational designs that balance not only the hierarchical tradeoffs of control versus
autonomy, but also a third design criterion: collaboration (Applegate 1994). The challenge for
managers, then, is to become not only effective vertical strategists, but also horizontal strategists
(Mohrman 1993, Porter 1985).
Among the design tools for horizontal strategists are horizontal mechanisms, defined by
Mintzberg (1979) as structural and non-structural devices that encourage contacts between
individuals in order to coordinate the work of two units. The challenge for researchers is to
develop useful ways to categorize these new design tools in order to identify patterns associated
with best practices (Mohrman 1993, Nadler et al. 1992).
A trend toward the adoption of new organizational designs that balance the hierarchical tradeoffs
of control versus autonomy has also been documented for the IS function (e.g., Brown and
Magill 1998, Earl 1996, Rockart, Earl and Ross 1996). In particular, many multi-divisional
companies have adopted a Federal design for the IS organization in which IT infrastructure
responsibilities are centralized in order to respond to enterprise-level pressures for connectivity
and economies of scale, but systems development responsibilities are decentralized to business
units in order to respond to division-level pressures for autonomy over strategic IS resources.
Horizontal mechanisms directed at the third design criterion-collaboration-have also been
utilized by IS managers. For example, cross-functional teams and liaison roles (Zmud 1988)
have been implemented to achieve collaboration not only across IS units and business units, but
also across multiple systems development units under a Federal form of IS governance
(DeSanctis and Jackson 1994). Yet to date we have not developed useful ways to classify
structural as well as non-structural mechanisms for the IS function. We also have little empirical
IS research on which to base managerial guidelines.
The objective of this study is to increase our knowledge about horizontal mechanism usage for
corporate/division coordination of the IS function as a first step toward theory building and the
development of theory-based guidelines for CIOs and other top managers. The overall research
questions of interest for this study are: What horizontal mechanisms are being used to promote
collaboration across corporate/division boundaries, and how does mechanism usage compare
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under different IS governance contexts? Unlike prior IS research, a more holistic approach is
taken. The intent is to increase our knowledge about the top-down selection of both structural
(groups, roles) and non-structural mechanisms, as well as the hierarchical reporting arrangements
under which a given mechanism is perceived to be effective.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Prior relevant research by both organization theorists and IS researchers is reviewed in this
section in order to provide theoretical grounding for this study. First, selected conceptual
research by organizational theorists is discussed. The objectives here are to gain an overall
understanding of the theoretical importance of coordination mechanisms as design tools, as well
as to identify categories of structural and non-structural mechanisms for achieving collaboration
across organizational units. Next, we identify what we know and don't know about top-down
mechanisms implemented by CIOs or other top managers to facilitate collaboration across
corporate/division boundaries, based on empirical IS research.
Prior Organizational Theory
Horizontal linking mechanisms are organization design innovations that first appeared in the
organization theory literature in the 1960s (Mintzberg 1979). According to Mintzberg,
horizontal mechanisms are devices designed to encourage liaison contacts between individuals in
order to coordinate the work of two units. According to organization theorists of the past two
decades, different types of horizontal mechanisms have different cost/benefit tradeoffs (see
Figure 1). For example, Galbraith (1973) was the first to propose a continuum of horizontal
mechanisms based on their increasing ability to handle information. The theoretical tradeoff is
that the mechanisms that provide greater lateral information processing and coordination are
more costly to implement. As seen in Figure 1, direct contacts between managers afford only
modest increases in information processing, but are a simple mechanism with low
implementation costs. More costly arejbrmal groups for temporary or ongoing problem-solving,
such as ad hoc task forces or more permanent teams that have representatives from multiple
units, and formal roles responsible for collaboration across different departments within an
organization, such as lower-level liaison roles and full-time integrating managers. Matrix forms
can be used to establish dual reporting relationships that ensure high levels of cross-unit
collaboration and accountability, although at the highest organizational cost.
All four of the theorists cited in Figure I view coordination mechanisms as design tools that are
used in addition to a firm's hierarchical reporting arrangements to increase coordination,
communication, and decision-making across organizational unit boundaries. For example,
Galbraith (1994) argues that vertical reporting arrangements focus an organization on its key
strategic demands, while horizontal mechanisms provide a more "lateral way of functioning."
Thus, no matter which hierarchical structure a firm implements (e.g., centralized, decentralized,
or federal), horizontal mechanisms can be used to help remove the barriers to cross-unit
collaboration that are created by the firm's reporting arrangements.
The formal mechanisms in the five continua in Figure 1 are remarkably similar. Galbraith's early
conceptualization (1973) of the integrating manager role as a mechanism with high information
processing capabilities is also shared by Mintzberg (1979) and Nadler and Tushman (1988).
Daft (1992) perpetuates Galbraith's earlier distinctions between lower-level liaisons and full-time
integrators, as well as between permanent teams and temporary task forces. However, Daft
views permanent teams as capable of higher levels of horizontal coordination than full-time
integrators, because teams are not dependent on the "people skills" of a single integrator. Daft
also advocates the synergistic usage of multiple mechanisms, such as both full-time integrators
and standing teams. Finally, a matrix form is modeled in the three earliest continua as the design
mechanism yielding the greatest benefits. In the two most recent continuua, however, both Daft
(1992) and Galbraith (1994) reconceptualize the matrix form as a structural device that
establishes dual reporting arrangements for a given mechanism, and do not include it as a
separate type of mechanism. This alternative view may also be in response to the problems
associated with matrix form implementations reported in the contemporary management
literature (e.g., Larson and Gobeli 1987).
Galbraith's (1994) most recent continuum is published in a monograph that takes a more holistic
view of structural and non-structural mechanisms to create a lateral organization capability. It is
a simplified scheme of two formal structures (integrator roles, formal groups) and an "informal
organization." Galbraith defines the informal organization in terms of non-structural design
actions that promote voluntary, cooperative problem-solving across unit boundaries and can
"provide a foundation" for the formal (structural) mechanisms. Provided in a list in Figure are
Galbraith's six "network-building" design practices that improve the likelihood of spontaneous,
voluntary contacts for cross-unit problem-solving. The list includes human resource practices,
such as job rotation, and interpersonal networking practices, such as physical co-location.
Training classes are highlighted as the most common example of an interdepartmental event that
can be designed to be a highly effective mechanism for cross-unit relationship building. As
described by Galbraith, at the end of a typical multi-day training session, the company not only
has people trained on the topic, but also has a group of people "who know each other, and some
who will continue their contact" (p.55).
Although two of the continua in Figure include only formal mechanisms (Mintzberg 1979,
Nadler and Tushman 1988), the importance of informal mechanisms as horizontal design tools is
a notion widely subscribed to by these and other management researchers. For example, Nadler
and Tushman (1992) assert that "informal" organization practices can exert considerable
influence on behavior. Robey (1991) suggests that socialization to norms and values "occurs
most directly through informal interactions," and Ghoshal and Bartlett (1996) describe the usage
of informal mechanisms for developing a shared vision across operating units. Mohrman (1993)
argues that a "fluid set" of both formal and informal mechanisms is required to achieve lateral
integration, and that informal mechanisms offer the advantage of being easier to implement and
redesign in highly complex, dynamic situations. Informal mechanisms, including direct contact
between managers, have also been prescribed for integrating work across subunits within global
firms (Hill 1994).
The specific inclusion of human resource practices in Galbraith's more recent work on horizontal
mechanisms (1994) is also supported by other management researchers. Porter (1985)
recommends horizontal human resource practices (including personnel rotation among business
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units) as devices to facilitate collaboration across business units for competitive advantage.
Nadler and Tushman (1992) include human resource management systems and reward systems as
part of a "formal organization" component to be designed by the organizational architect.
Galbraith's reconceptualization of horizontal linking devices to include an informal organization
is therefore consistent with the holistic approaches to organizational design advocated by other
management researchers. As a group, these researchers have also proposed the utilization of
horizontal mechanisms as not only devices to increase information processing capacity under
conditions of high environmental uncertainty, but also as lateral design tools to build and foster
the collaborative behaviors requisite for competitive advantage and organizational learning in
today's increasingly complex and uncertain business environments (e.g., Lawler 1996, Mohrman
1993). Along with other management researchers, they have also called for the need to learn
more about what combinations of decision-making structures and integrative mechanisms are
most effective (Galbraith et al. 1993, Hill et al. 1992, Lawler 1996, Mohrman 1993).
Prior IS Research
In order to identify what we know and don't know about horizontal mechanism usage for the IS
function, IS research published since the mid- 1980s was scanned for empirical studies on
horizontal mechanisms implemented by CIOs and other top managers to coordinate IS activities
across corporate and division boundaries. This literature search uncovered a total of thirteen
field studies that collected data on structural overlays or informal mechanisms for the IS
function. No empirical studies of human resource practices for the IS function from a horizontal
mechanism perspective were identified.'
As can be seen in Table 1, twelve of the thirteen field studies investigate a formal group
mechanism, and ten of these studied IS steering committees. The steering committee mechanism
typically creates a lateral organization capability between an IS unit and one or more business
units. The usage of an IS steering committee with business representatives is associated with
several favorable IS outcomes, including effective coordination and integration of IS planning
activities (Gupta and Raghunathan 1989), advanced IS budget and planning practices (Doll and
Torkzadeh 1987, Saaksjarvi 1994), large systems project selection and monitoring (McKeen and
Guimaraes 1985, McKeen, Guimaraes and Wetherbe 1994, Saaksjarvi 1994), and increased
managerial support and funding (Doll and Torkzadeh 1987, Torkzadeh and Xia 1992).
Two other field studies (Blanton et al. 1992, DeSanctis and Jackson 1994) describe evidence for
the usage of a formal group mechanism to increase coordination across decentralized IS units
with systems development responsibilities (i.e., systems development units that report to a
business unit) under a Federal design. DeSanctis and Jackson describe a case study (Texaco) in
which a formal IS standing team mechanism is implemented after informal mechanisms alone
(periodic IT conferences, roundtables) fail to meet the needs for coordination across
decentralized IS units. The authors also suggest that when decentralized IS units are
geographically separated, groupware support in combination with a formal group mechanism
improves the cost/benefit tradeoffs.
I The literature on mechanisms at the systems project level, such as cross-functional project teams, JAD sessions, the
role and benefits of user participation, was considered a related research stream outside the scope of this study
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Only two of the studies in Table I (Zmud and Lind 1986, Iacono et al. 1995) captured data on
formal roles as corporate/division linking mechanisms. Iacono et al. examined the work
practices of relationship managers who reported to a central IS director and were responsible for
the IS "accounts" of one or more business clients. These authors conclude that this type of
integrator role can be an "easy target" for IS budget cuts because of the difficulties associated
with measuring direct outcomes such as improved cross-unit coordination.
The usage of informal (non-structural) mechanisms is reported in three studies. Clark (1992)
reports that organizations with centralized IS resources frequently use a physical co-location
mechanism by firms with centralized IS resources-i.e., the dispersion of central IS personnel
into business areas. As mentioned above, DeSanctis and Jackson (1994) report that informal
mechanisms were tried but found to be insufficient for achieving coordination across
decentralized IS units under a Federal form.
In summary, the field studies in Table 1 document that formal group overlays are widely used
and can be effective top-down design tools to achieve coordination across IS units and business
units, as well as coordination across corporate and decentralized IS units. Table I also reveals
several gaps in our knowledge about mechanism usage. First, none of the prior studies attempts
to compare horizontal mechanism usage under different IS governance contexts. Second, we
have no evidence of the full range of formal and informal mechanisms implemented within a
single firm to achieve either corporate IS-business coordination or corporate IS-decentralized IS
coordination. Third, although this body of literature suggests that formal group mechanisms are
widely used for cross-unit collaboration, none of these studies captures data on the relative value
of a formal group versus a formal role mechanism, let alone the relative value of formal versus
informal mechanisms for a given context.
TOWARDS A THEORY OF MECHANISM USAGE
An underlying assumption of the above organization theory literature is that horizontal
mechanisms are implemented in order to remove barriers to cross-unit collaboration resulting
from hierarchical reporting arrangements. For studies of the IS function, the hierarchical
structure of interest is the form of IS governance-i.e., the corporate-business unit distribution of
IS decision-making. From the IS alignment literature (e.g., Brown and Magill 1998, Dixon and
John 1989, Earl 1996, Zmud et al. 1986), we can predict that the distribution of IS decision-
making responsibilities in large, divisionalized companies is an important design issue for two
broad resource areas: i) systems development and ii) IT infrastructure (computers and networks).
Three governance forms for the IS function currently predominate:
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Centralized A corporate IS unit (or other central unit) has primary authority and
responsibility for both IS resource areas.
Decentralized Business units have primary authority and responsibility for both IS resource areas for
their respective unit.
Federal (hybrid) A corporate IS unit has primary authority and responsibility for IT
infrastructure resource decisions, while business units have primary
authority and responsibility for systems development resource decisions
for their respective unit. The corporate IS unit also typically has an
oversight role for the decentralized resources, as well for any multi-
divisional systems.
Based on prior literature, large firms with a Decentralized IS decision-making context are least
likely to invest in horizontal mechanisms for corporate/division collaboration. Firms with such
IS contexts are likely to be firms with highly autonomous business units (Earl 1989) that compete
in unrelated businesses (Brown and Magill 1994), and thus have significantly lower opportunities
for IT-related cross-unit synergies (Brown and Magill 1998). A corporate level coordination role
may not even exist in such firms, and horizontal coordination initiatives may even be voluntary
(DeSanctis and Jackson 1994).2
In contrast, large organizations with the other two common forms of IS governance--Centralized
and Federal--are likely to invest in horizontal mechanisms for corporate/division collaboration in
order to reduce the barriers resulting from these hierarchical structures. This is because
companies with Centralized or Federal IS governance forms are likely to be firms that compete in
single or related businesses that seek IS cost efficiencies (through economies of scale and
standardized infrastructures) as well as cross-unit synergies (Brown and Magill 1998). Both of
these IS goals require cross-unit collaboration.
More specifically, under a Centralized IS governance form, all IS activities are performed in IS
units that report to the same IS management team. Coordination across these IS units (e.g., data
center operations, systems development) can be accomplished via the hierarchical reporting
arrangements. However, a Centralized governance form also creates what Galbraith refers to as a
"dysfunctional effect": a structural barrier to strong alignment with business management. Top
IS managers in Centralized forms are therefore likely to use horizontal mechanisms in order to
create a lateral organization capability between corporate IS and the organization's business
units.
Under a Federal IS governance form, decision-making responsibilities for IS activities are split
between corporate IS and business management: systems development units report directly to
business managers, while IS units responsible for the IT infrastructure (computers and networks)
report to corporate IS managers. The Federal governance form therefore fosters strong IS-
business collaboration through the reporting arrangements for the systems development units.
However, a Federal governance form also creates a "dysfunctional effect": a structural barrier to
strong alignment between division IS managers and corporate IS managers. Top IS managers in
Federal forms are therefore likely to implement horizontal mechanisms in order to create a lateral
organization capability between corporate IS and the decentralized IS units.
2 This supposition is also supported by Galbraith (1994) who argues that the corporate-initiated practice of
"excessive decentralization" to business units is a major cause of the lack of business unit interest in investing in
mechanisms to increase coordination across even related business units.
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Development of Propositions Based on Prior Research
Although the empirical IS research on horizontal mechanisms has significant gaps, a synthesis of
the findings in Table I with the prior organization theory literature does provide some theoretical
grounding for preliminary propositions to address our overall research questions: What
mechanisms are being used to promote collaboration across corporate/division boundaries, and
how does mechanism usage compare under different IS governance contexts? The organization
theory literature suggests that formal groups, formal roles, and several types of informal
mechanisms will be utilized by top IS managers to develop lateral organization capabilities for
the IS function. Although the prior IS literature provides only minimal evidence for the range of
mechanisms used, it does provide support for the theoretical argument that two kinds of lateral
organization capabilities will be found, defined below with a terminology shortcut:
Lateral
capability., Nature of IS coordination.
BU:IS coordinating activities across business units and IS units
IS:IS coordinating activities across centralized (corporate) and decentralized IS units
This leads us to our first proposition:
PI: Organizations with Centralized or Federal IS governance are likely to implement
multiple types of formal and informal coordination mechanisms to build and sustain a
lateral organization capability.
1A: Organizations with Centralized IS governance are likely to implement
multiple types of formal and informal mechanisms to build and sustain a lateral
organization capability across business units and IS units (BU:IS).
lB: Organizations with Federal IS governance are likely to implement multiple
types of formal and informal mechanisms to build and sustain a lateral
organization capability across corporate and decentralized IS units (IS:IS).
Further, two categories of formal mechanisms, also referred to as structural overlays, have been
identified by organization theorists: formal groups and formal roles. The predominant view
among these theorists is that a full-time integrator role mechanism provides greater coordination
benefits, and higher implementation costs, than a cross-unit group mechanism. However, Daft
(1992) argues that because of the dependence on the people skills of individuals in the integrator
role positions, permanent teams (formal groups) provide greater coordination benefits. The prior
IS research summarized in Table 1 seems to support Daft's views. The IS empirical study of an
integrator role for corporate/division coordination (Iacono et al. 1995) suggests that when central
IS managers play these roles, coordination goals can be difficult to achieve and benefits can be
difficult to quantify. Given the continued reports of "woefully lacking" business knowledge and
skills among IT professionals (e.g., Rockart, Earl and Ross 1996), the theoretical benefits
associated with the integrator role mechanism are likely to be attained at a considerable
organizational cost.
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In contrast, there is a relatively large body of IS research documenting the usage and
effectiveness of formal groups for cross-unit collaboration. Two different group mechanisms are
likely to be valued. First, an IS steering committee with business division representation is likely
to be an important BU:IS mechanism under Centralized IS contexts, because a Centralized
hierarchical structure does not foster this type of collaboration. Second, an IS standing team of
corporate IS managers and decentralized IS unit heads (typically IS managers with systems
development responsibilities who report to line managers under a Federal design) is likely to be
an important IS:IS mechanism under Federal IS contexts, because the Federal hierarchical
structure does not foster this type of collaboration.
This suggests that formal group mechanisms for corporate/division collaboration are likely to
provide better cost/benefit tradeoffs than integrator roles do. The second proposition is therefore
as follows:
P2: Organizations with Centralized or Federal IS governance are likely to perceive
formal group mechanisms as more effective than integrator roles for building and
sustaining a lateral organization capability.
2A: Organizations with Centralized IS governance are likely to perceive a
steering committee mechanism (with business management representation) as
more effective than an integrator role mechanism for BU:IS coordination.
2B: Organizations with Federal IS governance are likely to perceive an IS
standing committee mechanism (with centralized and decentralized IS managers)
as more effective than an integrator role mechanism for IS:IS coordination.
A Categorization Scheme of Horizontal Mechanisms Based on Prior Literature
The objective of this section is to develop a theory-based categorization scheme of horizontal
mechanisms for corporate/division coordination of the IS function to facilitate the data analysis
for this study. Based on a synthesis of the organization theory and IS empirical literature
discussed earlier, this scheme includes both formal and informal mechanisms that may be used
by CIOs and other top managers to achieve BU:IS and IS:IS coordination.3
First, as discussed above, the IS empirical research in Table I provides us with strong evidence
for the utilization of a formal group mechanism to achieve cross-unit coordination of IS
activities. Two formal group mechanisms are documented: steering committees with business
unit representatives, and standing committees that consist of IS managers from both centralized
(corporate) IS and decentralized IS units. As argued for Proposition 2, steering committees have
been associated with BU:IS coordination, IS standing committees with IS:IS coordination. In
Table 2, these mechanisms are categorized as type 1 a and type b, respectively.
Second, an integrator role mechanism is conceptualized by organization theorists as a design tool
for establishing a high degree of cross-unit collaboration. When this mechanism is implemented
3 As stated previously, the scope here is corporate/division level, not project level.
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in a matrix (two-boss) structure, cross-unit accountability is strengthened. A specific type of full-
time integrator in which a central IS manager (without direct IS reports) is responsible for
managing one or more internal customer "accounts" has been documented (Iacono et al. 1995).
No field studies of integrator role positions that are accountable for achieving both decentralized
unit goals and centralized IS goals under Federal governance forms were found. However, this
type of integrating manager has been reported on in other IS literature. For example, systems
managers who report to a business division and have their own systems development units may
be responsible for playing an integrating manager role with corporate IS, often with a two-boss
reporting structure (e.g., Brown and Magill 1994, Von Simson 1990). This suggests that cross-
unit integrators may be implemented in either Centralized or Federal IS contexts, serving either a
BU:IS or IS:IS coordination function. In Table 2 this type of formal role is referred to as a Cross-
unit Integrator and is categorized as type 2a.
Another type of formal role mechanism, corporate IS oversight roles, has emerged as IT
investment expenditures throughout the enterprise have increased and standardized IT
architectures have become more important (Applegate and Elam 1992). For example, formal
mechanisms for setting and monitoring IT infrastructure standards, such as corporate review
roles for IT acquisition requests, are likely to be found in firms with shared IS resources--i.e., in
firms with either Centralized or Federal governance forms. In Table 2, this type of formal role is
categorized as type 2b.
Third, recent organization theorists have argued for the importance of informal (non-structural)
mechanisms, in addition to formal (structural) mechanisms, as design tools for horizontal
strategists (Galbraith 1994, Mohrman 1993, Nadler and Tushman 1992). Three of the network-
building design actions for the informal organization described by Galbraith (1994) have been
documented in the empirical IS literature and are included in the categorization scheme under the
category labeled Informal Networking Practices: physical co-location (type 3a),
interdepartmental events (type 3b), and information technology (IT) networks (type 3c). More
specifically, Clark (1992) has provided evidence for the frequent utilization of the physical co-
location mechanism for BU:IS collaboration, in which systems development personnel are
physically co-located with their business clients. The utilization of periodic interdepartmental
events (IT conferences and roundtables) and IT networks (e-mail and other groupware) for IS:IS
coordination is documented in a case study by DeSanctis and Jackson (1994). The IS literature
that calls for IS/business alignment and IT professional reskilling suggests that interdepartmental
events and other informal networking opportunities to promote BU:IS networking are also likely
to be implemented in today's large organizations (Rockart, Earl and Ross 1996). The recent
widespread diffusion of intranets also increases the likelihood of informal BU:IS and IS:IS
networking via IT networks.
Fourth, the two human resource practices identified by Galbraith (1994) have been included in
the categorization scheme under the category labeled Cross-Unit Human Resource Practices: job
rotation (type 4a) and cross-unit input to performance reviews (type 4b). These mechanisms can
be used to promote either BU:IS or IS:IS coordination. Although the primary rationale for their
inclusion comes from organization theory, support for their potential relevance is found in prior
conceptual IS research. For example, cross-functional (IS-line) career pathing and incentive
9
schemes that reward IS-line partnership relations are discussed by Zmud (1988) as mechanisms
to influence managerial behaviors. Both of these HR practices also appear to be useful
mechanisms for building a predisposition toward, and a perception of mutual benefits from,
cross-unit partnerships as described by Henderson (1990).
The resulting categorization scheme to be utilized for data analysis therefore contains a total of
four categories and nine types of mechanisms for corporate/division coordination of the IS
function.4
METHODOLOGY
A synthesis of the prior organization science and IS literature suggests that there are major gaps
in our knowledge about the usage of mechanisms for the IS function. In particular, no prior study
has investigated mechanism usage for the IS function using a categorization scheme of formal
and informal mechanisms or has investigated mechanism usage under different IS governance
contexts. A case research methodology was therefore chosen for this study in order to collect
rich descriptive data on mechanism usage. The case research approach also allows the researcher
to take advantage of unique case features and opportunities for triangulation (Eisenhardt 1989).
Its primary drawback is that the generalizability of the results is limited to propositions for future
research, not to a population.
A theoretical sampling method was used to identify two case sites that would allow us to confirm
or disconfirm the propositions. Senior managers of IS and non-IS units in two Fortune-500
manufacturing firms--one with a Centralized IS governance context and one with a Federal IS
governance context-participated in the data collection. s These two case sites provide an
appropriate theoretical sampling for the following three reasons. First, both had well established
implementations of the IS governance forms of interest: Company C had been evolving toward a
more Centralized IS governance form over the past decade, and Company F had been evolving
toward a Federal form over the same time period. Second, the in-place CIOs at the both case
sites were the primary architects of the IS organization designs being studied. Third, the
researcher was also assured of access to other senior managers at each site who could share
background knowledge about the corporate/division mechanisms from key IS and non-IS
stakeholder positions. Both CIOs had been in their positions for a period of several years and,
based on the interviews with the other managers, were regarded as proactive vertical and
horizontal strategists for the IS function.
Multiple methods were utilized to collect data on the in-place mechanisms as part of a larger
study on the alignment of the IS function during 1991-1992. The primary objectives for the larger
study were to increase knowledge about factors which influence a change in the hierarchical
4 The remaining design action identified by Galbraith ( 1994), mirror-image organizational structure, was not
included in the categorization scheme because it is more typically viewed as a structural design option for the IS
organization, rather than a horizontal linking mechanism (e.g., Martin et al. 1994).
5 For a similar site selection strategy, see Olson (1981).
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structure for the IS organization (Centralized, Decentralized, Federal), as well as how horizontal
mechanisms contribute to the successful implementation of this IS governance form; its intended
outcome was theory-building. First, on-site, semi-structured interviews were conducted in order
to develop a list of specific coordination mechanisms at each case site, as well as qualitative data
on mechanism intent and effectiveness. In order to obtain scaled ratings of the relative
importance of the full set of mechanisms identified during the interviews, a survey form was then
developed for each case site and administered by mail to the same organizational participants.
This multi-method approach therefore provided the opportunity to triangulate the interview
findings with data collected by mailed survey.
At both case sites, a direct report to the CIO served as the primary contact for the researcher. The
primary contact provided relevant historical information about the company and the IS function,
assisted with the identification and solicitation of the target participants, scheduled all interviews,
and provided feedback for various confirmatory documents (described below). In consultation
with the researcher, a sample of IS and non-IS senior managers who provided similar stakeholder
viewpoints across the two case sites and were considered knowledgeable about the mechanisms
of interest were identified and asked to participate. As can be seen in Table 3, the IS participants
interviewed at each company included the senior executive of the corporate IS unit (CIO) and
directors of corporate and decentralized IS units, as relevant. The non-IS managers interviewed
included one V.P. of a corporate function and a minimum of two operating group or division
V.P.'s.
Prior to all on-site interviews, each participating executive received a one-page prospectus
developed by the researcher that introduced the study and its objectives. Each interview began
with a discussion of the current IS reporting arrangements. The data on specific coordination
mechanisms were elicited via open-ended questions: the executives were asked to identify in-
place mechanisms that were "keys to success" for the company to achieve its IS performance
objectives, given its IS governance design (Centralized or Federal). Organization charts and other
relevant company documents provided by the participants were also scrutinized.
Following the completion of all interviews for each case site, the responses elicited from the
open-ended questions were aggregated in order to develop a full list of specific mechanisms at
each case site. The mechanisms related to human resource practices-including
training/development opportunities, job rotation examples, and practices related to performance
reviews-were recorded in a separate listing from the others. The reason for this separate listing
was that at the time of the data collection, human resource practices had not been conceptualized
as horizontal mechanisms in the organization theory literature known to the researcher. 6
These two lists of mechanisms provided the content for the follow-up survey. Each mechanism
was presented in the survey form using terminology understandable to all participants, with
enough details to ensure shared meaning among the IS and non-IS managers who were
interviewed. For example, for each formal group mechanism, the company-specific name of the
committee or team was listed, along with its membership. The survey form asked for ratings of
importance for each mechanism on a 7-point scale, with 7 = Extremely important, 1= Not at all
important, using the "keys to success" wording that had been used in the elicitation of the
6 It is not known whether any bias in the responses was introduced by this presentation ordering.
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mechanisms during the on-site interviews. The participants were also asked to confirm the
completeness of each list of mechanisms by adding any omitted mechanisms and rating them on
the scales provided. Each survey form was mailed directly by the researcher to the IS and non-IS
managers who were interviewed, and all survey forms were mailed back directly to the
researcher. Unfortunately, complete surveys were not received from two of the non-IS managers
who were interviewed at Company C.
The initial within-case data analysis was descriptive and was reported back to the participants in
the form of a confidential report for each case site. Narrative descriptions of the overall firm, its
IS organization history, and the individual mechanisms listed in the survey form were followed
by a presentation of the findings on the relative importance of the mechanisms for the successful
implementation of the IS governance form. Aggregate findings were reported only, based on the
promise of anonymity by the researcher. First, the qualitative findings based on the interviews
were presented for each mechanism listed in the survey form, followed by the quantitative
findings in graphical form, and then the researcher's interpretation of the results. Each company-
specific report was initially previewed by the primary contact and CIO at the case site, and then
shared with all of that firm's participants. Feedback on these reports was received from the same
company executives.
For the data analysis to evaluate the two propositions for this study, each company-specific
mechanism was classified by the researcher according to the categorization scheme in Table 2,
and then coded according to the type of lateral organization capability (BU:IS or IS:IS) it was
intended to build and sustain, based on the interview data. For example, an advisory board of
senior business executives for IS strategy, policy, and resource issues at Company F was
classified as category #1 (formal groups), type a (steering committees), and coded BU:IS
(intended to coordinate across corporate IS and the business divisions). The IT management
committee at Company F that was reconstituted to include both corporate and division IS
directors was classified as category #1, type lb (IS standing teams), and coded IS:IS.
Galbraith' s monograph (1994) was the primary source for classifying the category #3 and
category #4 mechanisms. For example, training/development (T/D) events sponsored by various
organizational units (corporate IS, corporate HR, or a business division) were identified by the
participants as opportunities for building interpersonal networks. BU:IS collaboration was
facilitated by T/D events on business topics that brought together business and IS personnel;
IS:IS collaboration was facilitated by T/D events that were accessible to both corporate and
divisional IS staff. These T/D mechanisms were coded as category #3 (informal networking
practices), type 3b (interdepartmental events), rather than as category #4 (cross-unit human
resource practices), based on Galbraith's rationale (see Literature Review section above).
Mean scores and standard deviations were calculated for each specific mechanism based on the
survey responses. Due to the small number of participants at each case site, visual inspection
was used for drawing comparisons. A comparison of the approximately equal number of IS and
non-IS participants at Company F revealed only one significant disagreement across these two
participant groups. Specifically, the CIO's advisory committee of senior business executives
(type 1 a) at Company F was rated 5 or above on the 7-point scale by all IS respondents, but was
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rated 4 or below by all non-IS respondents (s.d. 2.09). This same discrepancy was also identified
during the interview phase.7
The qualitative interview data are the primary data source for the testing of the propositions.
Narrative descriptions for each specific mechanism are provided for reference in Appendix A.
The testing of Propositions IA and I B involves comparing counts of the mechanisms for each
case site by intent (BU:IS or IS:IS).8 The mean scores for specific mechanisms based on the
survey responses are used only as supplementary sources of evidence for proposition testing, and
were especially useful when the interview data yielded unexpected findings. For Proposition 2,
for example, the survey scores for the relevant category #I and #2 mechanisms are reported as
corroborating evidence for the interview findings.
Confirmation of the company-specific findings was achieved in the following four ways. First,
as part of the development of the survey form for each case firm, draft lists of the mechanisms
elicited from the interview participants were reviewed by each firm's primary contact and CIO to
ensure accuracy of description and shared meaning. Second, the participants were asked to note
any omitted mechanisms on the survey form, and no omitted mechanisms were identified by any
of the participants. Third, the confidential reports described above were shared with each
company's IS and non-IS participants. Fourth, an earlier version of this paper was also reviewed
by the primary contact and CIO at each case site.
The above methods for this study were selected in an attempt to satisfy the logical tests of
construct validity, reliability, and external validity (Yin 1984). The researcher also attempted to
avoid previously identified methodological problems with case-based research (Benbasat et al.
1987). More specifically, the constructs of interest were mechanisms for building a lateral
organization capability. Construct validity was achieved by the collection of data from multiple
informants, both IS and non-IS, and by the participant review of the researcher's case study
reports. Reliability was achieved by the use of the same case study protocol for both case sites.
In addition, the use of multiple data collection methods allowed for triangulation across the
individual interview findings and aggregate survey findings. Although external validity cannot
be claimed with a two-case design, literal replication was achieved because both case sites were
predicted to develop a lateral organization capability for the IS function using multiple types of
mechanisms. Theoretical replication was achieved because the two case sites were predicted to
develop different kinds of lateral organization capabilities due to their Centralized versus Federal
IS governance forms.
7 Three other mechanisms also had high standard deviations, but these were not due to IS versus non-IS differences
of opinion. Two mechanisms were corporate IS oversight roles (type 2b): the review of PC requests at Company C
(s.d. 2.00) and the data administration position at Company F (s.d. 1.92). The third mechanism with a high standard
deviation was also the mechanism with the lowest mean score: frequent job rotations (type 4a) at Company F (s.d.
1.92).
8 This analytic approach is similar to the calculation of a mechanism "complexity score" by Hill et al. (1992).
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RESULTS
The overall objective of this study is to enrich our understanding about horizontal mechanism
usage for the IS function under different governance contexts as a first step toward theory
building and the development of theory-based guidelines for managers. The specific objective of
the data analysis is to confirm or disconfirm propositions concerning the similarities and
differences of horizontal mechanism usage (P1) and the relative importance of two types of
structural mechanisms (P2) under Centralized versus Federal IS governance structures, based on
a theoretical sampling. As described above, the case research approach also provides the
opportunity to capture data of a longitudinal nature to better understand top management's
rationale for selecting a given mechanism.
Due to space considerations, the detailed descriptions of the specific top-down mechanisms at
each firm are placed in Appendix A. These descriptions are based on an aggregation of the
interview responses, although quoted phrases (or words) are provided in an attempt to
communicate the flavor of a specific characteristic or to highlight a particular insight. The
sequencing of the mechanism descriptions follows the 4-category scheme in Table 2 that was
developed for this study.
During the analysis of the interview data on the lateral organization capability (BU:IS or IS:IS)
associated with each mechanism, some individual mechanisms were found to be important for
both kinds of capabilities. For example, the cross-unit integrator role positions at the director
level for the decentralized IS unit heads at Company F (type 2a) were implemented with the
intent to not only ensure a strategic IS/business alignment that had not been possible when these
were lower level positions, but also to facilitate greater collaboration with the corporate IS
leadership; the IS director positions were only one hierarchical reporting level below the CIO and
other business executives. Similarly, all four of the cross-unit human resource practices at
Company F (types 4a and 4b) were described as facilitating cross-unit collaboration of both
kinds-both BU:IS and IS:IS. For example, cross-functional moves in and out of IS units
increased the likelihood that cooperative problem-solving would occur across business and IS
boundaries, while cross-functional IS moves in and out of corporate IS increased the likelihood
of cooperative problem-solivng across corporate IS and division IS unit boundaries.
The results of the analysis of the interview data, utilizing the categorization scheme, are
summarized in Table 4. As described above, five mechanisms at Company F are recorded in
both columns (BU:IS and IS:IS): the elevation of the decentralized IS heads to the director level
(type 2a), and four job rotation practices (types 4a, 4b). These mechanisms are counted in both
the BU:IS and IS:IS totals for Company F, but are not double-counted in the overall totals for
Company F.
The qualitative findings reported in the text below, Appendix A, and Table 4 are the primary
source of data for the testing of the propositions. The quantitative survey data are used as
corroborating evidence. The mean scores and standard deviations for each of the specific
mechanisms categorized in Table 4 are presented in order from highest to lowest mean score in
Appendix B for Company C and in Appendix C for Company F. Shading is used to graphically
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distinguish mechanisms directed at an IS:IS lateral capability (versus BU:IS) using the coding(s)
reported in Table 4.
Before discussing the findings for the two propositions, the organizational context and the CIO's
overall thrust in horizontal mechanism usage are described below, followed by some selected
highlights from the mechanism findings.
Context: Company C
Company C was a Fortune 500 diversified manufacturing firm pursuing a corporate strategy of
related diversification with greater than 10,000 total employees and three major operating groups.
Its largest businesses were clustered in two different regions of the country. The firm had a
history of centralized decision-making emanating from headquarters; corporate reviews of the
major business units were held regularly.
The CIO was a corporate officer at the V.P. level, reporting to a Senior V.P. of Administration,
and had a decade-long tenure in this position. Other senior managers in the firm regarded him to
be an effective architect of the current IS organization, which had approximately 200 employees
excluding contractors. The highly Centralized IS governance form at Company C was perceived
to match well Company C's enterprise-wide emphasis on efficiencies and standard operating
procedures. Whereas at the beginning of the CIO's tenure there were two "competing" and
geographically separate IS groups with decision-making authority and severe IS personnel
turnover problems, a single, highly Centralized IS organization with a very stable IS workforce
had been in place for several years prior to the data collection.
Five IS directors, a controller, and two IS managers reported to the CIO.9 Telecommunications &
network planning and operations were totally centralized. Data center operations were highly
centralized, although decision-making for some distributed platforms resided in the business
units. Three other IS directors had systems development responsibilities, one for each of
Company C's operating groups; each systems director had a reporting relationship to the CIO
only. One of these three directors also had systems development responsibilities for corporate
units, and was located at headquarters; the other two systems directors were physically located at
their divisions, along with their systems development staffs. No systems development backlog
currently existed, because contract personnel were regularly hired to increase the IS workforce as
needed.
According to the CIO, horizontal mechanisms had been implemented at Company C to help
create an IS organization that seemed "homogeneous" from the inside, yet "customer-driven"
from the outside. In addition to the integrator role mechanisms played by the systems directors
that had been in place for a few years, several non-structural mechanisms had also been
implemented specifically to increase the responsiveness of corporate IS to the systems needs of
the divisions. The most recent BU:IS mechanism was a business client survey that was to be used
9 Several corporate functions, including some IS functions, were decentralized to the management of a three-year-
old joint venture just prior to the data collection. This IS unit did not appear on the IS organization chart, and was
viewed by the CIO as a "temporary aberration." Mechanisms to collaborate across corporate IS and the new IS unit
of the joint-venture are outside the scope of this study.
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as input to performance reviews of IS personnel. Corporate IS personnel were also strongly
encouraged to take advantage of internal training courses on business topics that were regularly
offered on-site. Two examples of recent cross-unit (BU:IS) moves were also identified as
potential top-down mechanisms to improve corporate IS-business collaboration in the future.
Context: Company F
Company F is a Fortune 500 manufacturing firm of greater than 10,000 total employees with a
single primary business in a highly regulated industry. The firm's activities were structured by
function, and large divisions for R&D, manufacturing, and marketing were managed by general
managers who for the most part were located in the same metropolitan area as corporate
headquarters. Under the current CEO, there had been a growing emphasis on division autonomy.
The CIO held the title of Executive Director and reported to an Executive V.P. A relatively pure
Federal governance form for the IS function was in place at the time of the data collection for the
more than one thousand IS employees who were based in the U.S. This Federal design was a
result of events spanning more than a decade, and was perceived to be well aligned with the
company's increased emphasis on division autonomy. Two IS units reporting to R&D
management had had responsibility for systems development decisions for two decades and also
independently operated some specialized computer platforms. Systems development units
reporting to the IS manager level had also been decentralized to the other large divisions five to
six years earlier. During the past two years, formerly centralized systems maintenance activities
had also been moved to these decentralized IS units, and systems development and maintenance
responsibilities had been decentralized to two corporate departments as well (finance, human
resources).
Five U.S.-based IS directors with infrastructure responsibilities (data center,
telecommunications/networking, technology planning) and systems development responsibilities
for cross-division applications were solid-line reports to the CIO. Six other IS directors with
systems development responsibilities were solid-line reports to their division managers.'0
As the extent of decentralized IS activities increased over the past two years, several new
mechanisms had been initiated by corporate IS in an attempt to build better "partnerships" across
corporate IS units and the decentralized IS units. The first of these new mechanisms was the
elevation of all decentralized IS heads to the director level; this resulted in a doubling of the total
number of IS directors in the corporation. In conjunction with this initiative, a matrix reporting
relationship--solid line still to the business unit, but a new dotted line to the CIO-was
established for the decentralized IS unit heads in order to increase their accountability to
corporate IS. The CIO had also reconstituted two IS standing teams. In the past the CIO had met
weekly with his direct reports, but now the decentralized IS heads at the director level (dotted-
line reports) were also included in the CIO's weekly staff meetings. All directors also belonged
to a second IS standing team that met bi-weekly with HR personnel to discuss corporate and
divisional IS job moves at a certain level. The CIO reported that management buy-in to these
new mechanism designs involving the decentralized IS unit heads had been achieved via his
advisory committee of senior business executives.
10 A twelfth IS director had European systems responsibilities, but mechanisms designed for coordinating units
across national boundaries were outside the scope of this study.
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The cross-unit partnering objectives of the corporate IS leadership appeared to align well with the
culture at Company F: "people development" was one of the firm's core values. Cross-
functional moves had been formally encouraged by the corporate HR department for several
years as a way of nurturing employees of high potential. However, a related corporate HR
practice that had previously been highly valued by the participants--internal moves every 18 to 24
months for high performers--was beginning to cause concerns among some of the IS and non-IS
managers: divisions didn't want to "lose" IS personnel in which they had made significant
training and development investments.
Findings for Proposition 1
Proposition I predicts that both firms are likely to have multiple types of formal and informal
mechanisms. Proposition 1A predicts that Company C has multiple types of in-place
mechanisms to build and sustain a BU:IS lateral organization capability, while Proposition IB
predicts that Company F has multiple types of mechanisms to build and sustain an IS:IS
capability.
The findings for Proposition 1 based on the interview data are summarized in Table 4. Overall,
the interview data provide support. As can be seen from the summary totals at the bottom of
Table 4, specific mechanisms of all four categories and eight or nine types were identified at both
companies. At Company C, the majority (13) of the 23 mechanisms were directed at building and
sustaining a BU:IS lateral organization capability. There was also a significant investment in
formal roles (category #2) to achieve BU:IS collaboration. These involved both the integrator
roles played by the system directors and several oversight roles for IT infrastructure investments
under the purview of business management. The non-structural mechanisms emphasized in the
interviews were also BU:IS mechanisms, including the co-location of the IS directors and their
systems development units (type 3a) and the newly implemented customer survey (type 4b).
At Company F, the majority (14) of the 17 specific mechanisms were implemented to build and
sustain an IS:IS lateral organization capability. As suggested by organization theorists, the
increased decentralization of systems development responsibilities to the business units over a
period of several years had indeed created barriers to coordination across corporate IS and the
decentralized IS units. Initially, IS:IS collaboration via interpersonal networks had been heavily
relied on; cross-unit interpersonal relationships were strong because of the firm's multi-year
history of aggressive, cross-unit job rotation practices (type 4a). However, the strength of these
informal linkages began to erode over time as the decentralized IS units grew in size and
responsibilities. During the on-site interview, the CIO was clearly pleased about business
management buy-in to several recent structural overlay initiatives: the elevation of all
decentralized IS unit heads to the director level (type 2a), their new matrix reporting structure
(type 2a), and the inclusion of these directors in his weekly staff meetings (type 1 b).
A striped-line relationship to the CIO for the decentralized IS unit heads was in fact used in the
internal IS organization chart, rather than the official dotted line. This sent a clear signal about
the importance attributed to this dual reporting relationship by the IS leadership. The directors in
these integrating positions who were interviewed made reference to their "dual allegiance" roles
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and reported serving on task forces with solid-line IS directors as part of their new IS standing
committee responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the interview data in Table 4 also suggest that Proposition I is insufficient: both
companies also had implemented three or four categories of mechanisms that were directed at the
second kind of lateral organization capability. That is, both Companies C and F had not only
implemented mechanisms to diminish the barriers to collaboration due to their IS governance
structure, as predicted by Proposition 1, but also had in-place mechanisms to supplement the
communication channels established by their current IS reporting arrangements.
More specifically, Company C's participants identified ten mechanisms in three categories that
had been implemented to improve IS:IS coordination across corporate IS personnel located in or
near headquarters and those located in geographically dispersed IS units under two of the
systems directors. In other words, even though all systems development units reported to
corporate IS directors, the geographical dispersion of these units and their directors created a
barrier to collaboration with the remainder of the corporate IS leadership. These IS:IS
mechanisms included tri-annual IS operating reviews held at the geographically dispersed sites
(type I b), training/development events that brought together corporate and division IS personnel
(type 3b), and new HR practices for IS personnel (category #4) that had been instituted across the
geographical clusters and included a common job posting system and corporate-wide
performance reviews and recognition awards.
Company F's unexpected investments in mechanisms to coordinate activities across corporate IS
and the business divisions (BU:IS) included eight mechanisms in a total of four categories.
However, as described above, five of these mechanisms (types 2a, 4a and 4b) actually
contributed to both kinds of lateral organization capabilities. Of the remaining mechanisms, the
biggest surprise was that an advisory committee of senior business executives that met
periodically with the CIO (type I a) was still viewed by the IS participants as a highly effective
BU:IS mechanism. The CIO's advisory committee had been established prior to the
strengthening of the integrator role mechanisms for the decentralized IS heads, and in the past it
had been a primary communication mechanism with the corporate IS leadership. However, the
senior business managers who were interviewed emphasized the utility of this mechanism in the
past, rather than its current effectiveness. This was because the heads of the decentralized IS
units were now formally responsible for integrating activities with the corporate IS leadership.
The impact of the decentralized IS positions on the relevance of the CIO's advisory committee
had not yet been fully recognized by the CIO and the IS directors at the time of the interviews.
The survey data (see Appendix B and C) provide corroborating evidence for the interview
findings for Proposition 1. First, only one mechanism received a mean score below the mid-
point (4.0) on the 7-point scale: the HR encouragement of frequent job rotations at Company
F. " l The quantitative data therefore provide supporting evidence for the unexpected finding that
mechanisms for both kinds of lateral capabilities were valued at each case site. Second, the
l The 3.8 mean score and high standard deviation (1.92) for this mechanism reflects the concerns expressed during
the interview phase by some IS and non-IS managers about "losing their" IS personnel to another division or
corporate IS; typical moves for high potential employees were reported to be less than two years.
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prediction that Company C would focus on mechanisms directed at building a BU:IS lateral
capability (P 1A) and that Company F would focus on mechanisms directed at an IS:IS lateral
capability (P 1 B) is supported by the highest mean scores at each case site. Third, the survey data
support the interview finding that non-structural mechanisms helped reduce the coordination
barriers due to the in-place IS governance structure. That is, two physical co-location
mechanisms directed at improving BU:IS coordination (type 3a) were among the three highest
rated mechanisms for Company C, and two HR practices (type 4a) were among the eight highest
rated mechanisms at Company F.
Findings for Proposition 2
Proposition 2 predicts that organizations are likely to perceive formal group mechanisms as more
effective than cross-unit integrators for building and sustaining a lateral organization capability.
Proposition 2A predicts that the participants at Company C will perceive a steering committee of
senior executives (type I a) to be more effective than the cross-unit integrator role positions of the
systems directors (type 2a). Proposition 2B predicts that the participants at Company F will
perceive its two IS standing teams of corporate and decentralized IS heads (type I b) to be more
effective than the director-level integrator role positions that now have a dotted-line report to the
CIO (type 2a).
Looking first at Proposition 2A, the CIO at Company C reported that an advisory committee of
top managers at the corporate level was not an appropriate mechanism at Company C due to his
position as corporate officer; that is, his participation on the company's top management team
obviated the need for a separate steering committee at this level. On the other hand, steering
committees for IS project prioritization and budgeting decisions had been implemented at the
division level. However, these division-level steering committees (type la) had not been
implemented enterprise-wide: the division-level steering committee mechanism was considered
to be an effective design tool for corporate/division coordination only when it matched the
"management style" of the division.
In contrast, the integrator role positions played by the systems directors at Company C (type I b)
were characterized as highly valued mechanisms for all major divisions. Except for the systems
director who also had corporate application responsibilities, the integrating managers were also
co-located in the business units they supported, along with their systems development employees.
This combination of integrator role and co-location mechanisms (types Ib and 3a) was viewed as
critical to the success of the company's Centralized IS governance structure. These mechanism
solutions also were perceived as in alignment with the cost efficiency goals of Company C.
The mean scores in Appendix B quantify the relative importance of the mechanisms in
Proposition 2A. The division-level steering committee mechanism (type la) was rated quite high
(6.0). However, the integrator role (type 2a) mechanism was rated even higher in importance
(6.3); the same rating was also given to the co-location mechanism for these integrators (6.3) and
the highest score (6.8) was given to the co-location mechanism for the systems development
units that reported to the systems directors. Although the sample size and makeup preclude a test
for significant differences, the survey findings do corroborate the interview findings: Proposition
2A is not supported.
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Turning next to Proposition 2B, Company F had two IS standing teams (type Ib) in place: a
standing committee of the solid-line corporate IS and dotted-line (decentralized IS director)
reports to the CIO that met weekly, and a systems personnel committee of all IS directors that
met biweekly to consider enterprise-wide IS personnel issues. Both of these committees had
been purposefully reconstituted by the CIO to include the decentralized IS heads at the director
level in order to increase corporate/division coordination. Despite the time commitment required
for these weekly meetings, both standing committees were viewed as highly effective
mechanisms for reducing the communication barriers created by the Federal design for the IS
organization. On the other hand, the reconstitution of these formal IS standing committees was
dependent on two design actions related to the integrator role mechanisms (type 2a): the
"elevation" of the decentralized IS heads to the director level as well as the implementation of the
matrix reporting relationship to the CIO. The interview data therefore suggest that it was the
combination of these two types of structural overlays-integrator roles and formal groups-that
was critical to the success of the company's Federal governance structure.
The mean scores in Appendix C quantify the relative importance of the mechanisms in
Proposition 2B. Both IS standing teams (type I b) had the same high mean score (5.8), but the
scores for the establishment of the director-level integrator role positions (6.2) and their new
dotted-line report to the CIO (6.1) were even higher. Although the differences in these mean
scores are small, the survey findings again corroborate the interview findings: Proposition 2B is
not supported.
DISCUSSION
Given the potential importance of horizontal mechanisms for facilitating collaboration across
organizational boundaries, the objective of this study was to increase our cumulative knowledge
about the utilization of these design tools under two different IS governance forms: Centralized
and Federal. As a first step, preliminary propositions were formulated based on a synthesis of
prior organization theory and IS research. Prior literature was also used to develop a
classification scheme in order to analyze the qualitative and quantitative data collected from two
case sites with theoretically different IS coordination needs.
Support was found for Proposition 1. As predicted, the IS executives at Companies C and F had
proactively implemented multiple types of formal (structural) and informal (non-structural)
mechanisms to build lateral organization capabilities for the IS function. Support was also found
for Propositions 1A and I B. Mechanisms of all four categories in the classification scheme were
used to build a BU:IS lateral organization capability at a firm with Centralized IS governance
(Company C) and an IS:IS lateral organization capability at a firm with Federal IS governance
(Company F). The highest valued mechanisms at the two companies were also of the kind
predicted: BU:IS mechanisms at Company C, IS:IS mechanisms at Company F.
The qualitative and quantitative data collected for this study therefore provide empirical support
for the theoretical assumption that coordination mechanisms are used to help eliminate or reduce
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the communication barriers ("dysfunctional effects") of in-place hierarchical structures in order
to achieve objectives that require cross-unit collaboration. At Company C, non-structural
mechanisms were used to create a more "customer responsive" IS organization that matched well
the company's overall cost-efficiency goals. At Company F formal structural overlays were
implemented to increase collaboration across IS managers in corporate and decentralized IS units
within a company that placed a high value on division autonomy, but also had economies of scale
and connectivity objectives for its global infrastructure.
However, Proposition 1 was also found to be insufficient. Company C and Company F not only
had in-place formal and informal mechanisms for the predicted kind of lateral organization
capability (BU:IS and IS:IS, respectively), but also had invested in mechanisms for the second
kind of lateral capability. In particular, Company C had in-place mechanisms to supplement its
hierarchical reporting arrangements because of the coordination difficulties associated with its
geographically dispersed (but not decentralized) IS units. In other words, the co-location and
integrator role mechanisms that were used to increase BU:IS coordination needed to be balanced
with additional IS:IS mechanisms. At Company F, the mechanisms for BU:IS coordination that
supplemented the Federal reporting relationships were for the most part mechanisms that pre-
dated several recent IS:IS mechanism initiatives. In fact, the relative importance of two of these
mechanisms had only recently begun to diminish: the CIO's advisory committee and the
corporate HR practice of frequent job rotations. In other words, the strengthened Federal
governance structure and integrator roles were just beginning to impact the importance of pre-
existing mechanisms.
Proposition 2 was not supported. The specific formal group mechanisms of interest had in fact
been implemented at the two case sites (steering committee at Company C, IS standing teams at
Company F) and were considered to be important by the participants at each case site. However,
the participants at both firms also highly valued their respective in-place integrator role
mechanisms. At Company F, the integrator role mechanisms were valued even more highly than
the two IS standing team mechanisms. At Company C, the integrator role mechanism
implemented enterprise-wide was valued more highly than the division-level steering committee
mechanism.
In addition, the contingent effectiveness associated with the steering committee mechanism for
BU:IS coordination (type l a) should be highlighted. At Company C, a steering committee at the
corporate level was viewed by the CIO as unnecessary; instead, collaboration was achieved by
virtue of the CIO's participation on the company's top management team. At Company F, the
advisory committee for the CIO received a much lower aggregate rating (5.1) than the formal
group mechanism directed at IS:IS coordination (type b). This suggests that the potential
effectiveness of the steering committee mechanism that has been reported in prior IS research is
highly contingent on organizational context. For example, when the IS organization has a
Federal structure and an integrating role mechanism is in place, this type of formal group
mechanism becomes a redundant mechanism for linking business management with corporate IS
(BU:IS). As seen at Company F, the IS standing team mechanism directed at increasing IS:IS
collaboration became the more important formal group mechanism under a Federal structure;
21
these IS standing teams established a new channel for corporate/division collaboration, whereas
the CIO's pre-existing steering committee became a redundant mechanism. 2
Before discussing the implications for these findings, several limitations need to be recognized.
First, the propositions for this study focused on top-down mechanisms and the findings are only
intended to be applicable to large firms with some sort of division structure. Second, as stated in
the Methodology section, the two-site theoretical sampling method used for this study does not
permit generalization to the population of large firms with Centralized or Federal IS decision-
making contexts; instead, these findings are limited to the development of insights for
empirically-grounded propositions for future research. Third, no objective performance
measures were captured. Instead, only perceptual measures of effectiveness were captured and
reported in aggregate form. Fourth, the sample size and coding schemes did not allow for
rigorous statistical tests of the quantitative survey data; only visual inspection was used for the
comparative analysis of quantitative data in support of the qualitative findings. Fifth, while a
preference for face-to-face communications clearly existed in both firms, the middle-range
ratings for the IT network mechanism (type 3c) at both case sites also reflects the time period of
data collection--i.e., the data for this study were collected prior to the recent explosive growth of
groupware tools and new electronic communication channels via the internet and intranets.
Sixth, the likelihood that context characteristics other than the firm's IS governance form may
influence top-down mechanism preferences was not systematically studied.
Implications for Research
Several important implications for future research can be gleaned from this study. First, the
support for Proposition 1 alone suggests that the IS empirical research to date has only scratched
the surface in terms of understanding mechanism usage for corporate/division coordination, let
alone differences in usage under different IS governance contexts. Evidence for the importance
of examining an organization's full suite of mechanisms is also provided here: CIOs in both
Centralized and Federal IS governance contexts are likely to implement multiple types of formal
and informal mechanisms to remove coordination barriers created by the reporting arrangements
for the IS organization. In addition, CIOs are likely to implement horizontal mechanisms to
supplement communication channels created by the hierarchical reporting arrangements for the
IS function, especially in contexts where IS governance is Centralized, but systems development
units are geographically dispersed. A more holistic approach to research on horizontal
mechanisms for the IS function, such as adopted for this study, is therefore clearly warranted.
However, there is also a need for investigations that focus on the specific design options for an
individual mechanism under differing IS contexts as well as specific coordination goals for an
individual mechanism. A recent survey of CIOs in primarily Fortune 500 companies with four
different types of IS governance structures (Brown and Sambamurthy 1998) provides some initial
empirical evidence on these issues.
12 As reported in the Methodology section, this was the only mechanism for which the IS and non-IS participants at
Company F provided significantly different ratings of importance: the IS participants valued this mechanism much
more highly than the non-IS participants. Whether or not the widespread attention that the steering committee
mechanism has received in the trade literature was a contributing factor to the lagging recognition of the diminished
importance of this advisory committee mechanism on the part of the IS participants is not known.
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Second, organization theorists have argued that the organizational architect will select
mechanisms based on their cost/benefit tradeoffs. Using the mechanism labels from the
categorization scheme developed for this study, for example, informal networking practices
would be expected to have the lowest implementation costs and integrator roles the highest. The
finding by DeSanctis and Jackson (1994) that large organizations with Federal designs are likely
to invest in more costly formal mechanisms for corporate/division coordination across
decentralized IS units1 3 and the findings of this study provide some support for this theoretical
viewpoint. Companies with Federal IS contexts pursue IS goals that require corporate/division
collaboration, and formal structural mechanisms are needed to remove the barriers to IS
collaboration created by these Federal structures.
However, this study also suggests that the evaluation of cost/benefit tradeoffs for single
mechanisms may be too simplistic a view. At Company F the implementation of cross-unit IS
standing teams was dependent on the establishment of other structural mechanisms: director-
level integrator role positions with a dotted-line report to the CIO. At Company C the
effectiveness of the integrator role positions was dependent on the physical co-location of these
systems directors and their systems development units. Company C, however, also then
implemented structural and non-structural mechanisms to ensure IS:IS coordination between
corporate IS management based at headquarters and the IS personnel at dispersed locations. As
suggested by Daft (1992), then, the mechanism choices yielding the greatest benefits may be
those that take into account combination effects. Assessing the tradeoffs created by multiple
mechanisms thus appears to be a more relevant cost/benefit approach.
The notion of a strong "informal organization" as a requisite "foundation" for more costly
structural overlays (Galbraith 1994) may also be worthy of more attention by IS researchers.
Company F provides an example of how enterprise-wide HR practices created a work
environment conducive to collaboration. Similarly, the co-location of systems directors at
Company C facilitated the participation of IS directors in business management meetings without
implementing a more costly dual reporting design. The recent survey findings by Brown and
Sambamurthy (1998) support these views; these authors have proposed an "iceberg" metaphor to
signal the importance of "below-the-waterline" informal mechanisms.
Management researchers have also suggested that organizational preferences for specific
mechanisms, and matrix forms, reflect the degree of "trust" between different organizational
units (e.g., Creed and Miles 1992). Similar to Galbraith's notion, then, informal approaches may
need to be implemented before more costly formal mechanisms in order to first build "trust"
across corporate/division boundaries. This suggests that studies that take a more holistic
approach, as well as research designs that capture longitudinal data, are needed to better
understand the potential relationships between formal and informal mechanisms.
13 The prior research finding by DeSanctis and Jackson ( 1994) that groupware improves the effectiveness of a
formal IS committee mechanism for coordination across decentralized IS units is neither strongly supported nor
contradicted here. Several formal mechanisms that relied on face-to-face conmunication were considered to be
successfully implemented for IS:IS coordination at Company F, but the only IT-based mechanism was a simple E-
mail mechanism.
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Another implication for future research is that research designs that capture context factors other
than IS governance are clearly needed, as also called for by other IS researchers (DeSanctis and
Jackson 1994, Saaksjarvi 1994). Of particular importance here are those factors that may
influence a company's interest in achieving synergies across organizational units (Galbraith
1994). For example, Company F was in a single primary business that had implemented highly
autonomous functional divisions; these divisions by definition had high interdependencies, and
the firm had for many years emphasized people development via cross-unit job moves. In
contrast, the CIO at Company C reported a corporate emphasis on operating efficiencies and a
satisfaction with less costly mechanisms for corporate IS coordination with business units. In
addition to these structural and cultural context factors, IS-related context factors that have been
associated with IS governance decisions, such as the strategic role of the IS function and level of
IT management knowledge on the part of senior business managers (Brown and Magill 1998),
may also be important for predicting top-down mechanism preferences. Brown and
Sambamurthy (1998) also point to the importance of capturing changes in business imperatives
and the organizational legitimacy of specific mechanisms outside of the IS function.
Implications for Practice
This study contributes to practice in three important ways. First, it provides evidence that today's
IS managers need to be effective horizontal, as well as vertical, strategists. In particular,
companies with Centralized or Federal IS structures need to implement horizontal mechanism in
order to break down the barriers to cross-unit collaboration created by these hierarchical
structures. Second, the theory-based categorization scheme developed for this study and used to
compare the mechanism implementations at the two case sites (Tables 2 and 4) can be utilized by
CIOs and other top managers as a framework to assess the lateral organization capabilities of
their own organizations-both for corporate IS-business coordination and for corporate-division
IS coordination.
Third, the data on horizontal mechanisms collected at the two case sites selected for this study
are not only theoretically useful, but also practically useful. In particular:
Company C provides an example of how an organization with highly Centralized IS
governance can use low-cost informal mechanisms, in combination with integrator role
positions for systems development directors, to become more "customer-driven."
Company F provides an example of how an organization with Federal IS governance can
strengthen corporate/division partnering by establishing a dual reporting relationship for
decentralized IS unit heads and reconstituting IS standing teams to include both corporate
and decentralized IS unit heads.
In addition, we found that companies with geographically dispersed IS units are likely to
implement additional mechanisms to ensure effective collaboration across these distributed units.
Fourth, this study highlights the notion that an effective lateral organization capability is
developed over time. Both CIOs in the case sites selected for this study had been proactive
horizontal strategists over a period of several years and exploited one of the strengths of
horizontal mechanisms as design mechanisms: they can be implemented piecemeal, without the
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organizational disruption that is associated with changes in governance forms. However, our
study also uncovered the need for CIOs to regularly assess the adequacy of in-place top-down
mechanisms, as well as the top-down mechanism potential of emergent practices, with input
from both IS and non-IS managers. At Company F, an erosion of the perceived effectiveness of
an HR practice (frequency of job rotations) and a long-standing advisory committee for the CIO
had not yet been fully recognized by the firm's IS executives. Similarly, this study uncovered
two recent instances of job rotation practices that improved corporate IS-business collaboration
at Company C and were more highly valued than several long-standing interdepartmental events
or corporate IS oversight roles, but had not yet been widely promoted by the CIO.
Conclusion
This study has attempted to expand our rather limited knowledge of mechanism usage for
corporate/division coordination of the IS function under Centralized and Federal IS governance
forms. The findings provide evidence that today's ClOs are indeed implementing multiple
formal and informal mechanisms in order to facilitate cross-unit collaboration, as advocated by
organization theorists. Specific mechanisms were classified using a categorization scheme
developed for this study in order to identify differences in mechanism usage under Centralized
and Federal IS governance contexts. The more holistic approach taken for this study also proved
to be useful for developing some initial insights about cost/benefit tradeoffs and combination
effects that deserve further investigation.
If the dual pressures for responsiveness to division needs and the attainment of enterprise-wide
synergies continue to increase as anticipated, expertise in the design of lateral organization
capabilities is likely to become a critical IS management competency. This study suggests that
the implementation of horizontal mechanisms for two kinds of capabilities--corporate IS
collaboration with business units as well as collaboration across decentralized or geographically
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Appendix A: Descriptions of Specific Horizontal Mechanisms
COMPANY C
Category #1: Formal Groups
An IS steering committee mechanism had been implemented at the operating group level. This
committee of business unit managers approved systems projects and determined project
prioritization for the respective divisions. Several managers suggested that this committee set up
a structure for "steering" which matched the "management style" of these businesses.
No steering committee existed at the corporate level. In fact, it was pointed out by the CIO that
the company "doesn't run that way" at the top management level. The CIO's position as an
officer of the company ensured regular face-to-face decision-making opportunities with C's top
management.
IS standing committees were also utilized to achieve coordination across the corporate IS
directors at headquarters and geographically dispersed divisions. Quarterly meetings were held
with the CIO and all IS directors at which each director reports on "what's happening." The
corporate IS organization also held thrice annual operating reviews for the operating groups in
which the CIO and all IS directors (and the group-specific IS managers and supervisors) had
face-to-face communication. A multi-day strategic planning session with the CIO and the IS
directors was also held annually, and all members of the IS management team--including the
dispersed directors--participated on task forces in preparation for this annual meeting. Each IS
director served as a moderator for the joint discussion of at least one strategic area.
Category #2: Formal Roles
The three corporate IS directors with systems development responsibilities had integrator role
responsibilities. In keeping with Company C's preference for centralized decision-making, no
"dotted line" relationship with the operating group heads existed, and the IS and non-IS
participants did not perceive such a mechanism to be needed. However, all three of these
systems directors were regularly included in meetings of their respective business unit's
management; that is, they were said to act as if there were a dotted-line reporting relationship.
Several corporate IS oversight roles were also in place to coordinate IT purchasing and leasing
contracts. Corporate IS executives had review authority for all IT acquisitions from external
sources, including mini-computer purchases for plants and PC purchases by business units.
Corporate IS had developed "white papers" with standards for PC hardware and software and
LANs, and also played a role in IT equipment lease contracts for the divisions.
Category #3: Informal Networking Practices
Each of the three directors with systems development responsibilities was physically co-located
near the top management of the operating company they supported: the director who had
corporate systems in addition to operating group responsibilities was located at headquarters,
while the other two directors were geographically dispersed. The objective was to "blend in with
the customer organization" to the extent that the director would actually feel like "one of them"--
and there would be a "comfortable exchange." Each systems development team was also
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physically located near the IS director they reported to, and therefore also co-located with the
management of the major operating group they supported. The co-located IS personnel were
reported to have "day-to-day" opportunities for "learning the business" due to this mechanism.
Several periodic interdepartmental events facilitated information sharing across business and IS
management, as well as across corporate and dispersed IS personnel. Information technology
demonstrations were periodically provided for the top management group. IS personnel were
strongly encouraged to take courses on topics related to the business. Technology
training/development opportunities, as well as technology conferences on an "as needed basis,"
were sponsored by corporate IS. Director-level IS personnel also had regular opportunities to
participate in the same offsite seminars.
An IT network that linked all IS managers, but not all division managers, provided E-mail
services. However, at the time of data collection, its usage for internal communication was not
as large as expected in the near future.
Category #4: Cross-Unit Human Resource Practices
A temporary job rotation assignment in a business unit had recently led to a permanent non-IS
career move to a financial analyst position for a well-regarded corporate IS employee. This
cross-functional move was touted as highly desirable. For example, the CIO offered he would
"like to do more IS/non-IS moves," and a division executive suggested it "may be a wave of the
future." Although staff development in general was referred to as a "critical success factor" for
corporate IS, no current initiatives specifically targeted business/IS moves. All internal IS
positions, however, were published on a corporate IS job listing to "actively encourage" moves.
Several recent initiatives had increased cross-unit input to performance reviews. An annual
customer survey had been initiated just prior to the data collection; this survey was viewed by IS
management as an important business input to IS performance assessments. "Totem" rankings of
IS personnel were established by "majority vote" of the IS directors in order to assist in the career
planning process. New, corporate-wide IS performance awards (with financial incentives
separate from merit increases) had also recently been implemented; sixteen awards had been
given by the CIO the preceding year to promote "people retention."
COMPANY F
Category #1: Formal Groups
An executive advisory board for IS strategy, policy, and resource issues had been in place for
some years. Under the current CIO, this steering committee had been reconstituted in
membership and mission. It was chaired by the CIO's boss and the members included operating
group V.P.'s, the CFO, and other key V.P.'s. According to the CIO, its mission included
"developing strategy." The general manager buy-in to the "value" of the IS function as well as to
the need for director-level positions for the decentralized IS units (see type #2 below) had also
been largely accomplished via this committee. One general manager reported but that, in the
past, it had been an effective communication mechanism to "link across" the organization. Since
the decentralization of systems development groups, the information he received from these
periodic meetings had helped him "to guide the IS people" he was responsible for. However, the
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non-IS managers also reported that the advisory committee "doesn't vote much." One of the IS
managers also reported that attendance at the committee meetings had dropped off.
Two formal IS standing committees also ensured a significant amount of "face time" every week
between corporate and decentralized IS unit heads in formal IS committee meetings; according to
one corporate IS director, "they're dispersed, but not autonomous." First, the decentralized IS
directors were expected to participate in corporate IS staff meetings with the CIO and his direct
reports once a week. This was a visible change in membership on this standing committee to
accommodate the recently elevated IS directors. (Task forces with corporate and decentralized IS
director representation were also commonly utilized by the CIO to study agenda items for these
staff meetings.) Second, a systems personnel committee of all corporate and dual-reporting IS
directors met bi-weekly with HR personnel in order to do personnel planning and reach
consensus on human resource decisions for IS managers, including job moves for corporate and
division IS personnel. The current CIO had increased the frequency of committee meetings, as
well as the range of issues discussed. The significant amount of in-person interaction time was
feasible because of the close geographical proximity of all U.S.-based IS units.
Category #2: Formal Roles
A recently completed initiative of the current CIO was the redesign of the decentralized IS unit
head positions into dual reporting integrator roles at a higher organizational reporting level. A
primary motivator was to "create a partnership inside" the business unit in order for IT to achieve
the "level of attention and understanding" needed to be a strategic enabler. This was
accomplished in two ways: i) elevation of these positions to the director level, and ii) the formal
implementation of a dotted-line reporting relationship to the CIO.
The elevation to director level was accomplished over a period of three years as individual
divisions accepted new systems development or maintenance responsibilities by "mutual
agreement."' 14 By the time of the data collection, the decentralized IS unit heads at the director
level had become "more privy" to "what's really going on" in their business unit--rather than
"learning third hand." They were considered a part of the management team of their division,
which put them "in a position to understand the issues and re-prioritize applications," and led to
"cohesive partnerships." There was now a "strategic thrust" for all but one decentralized IS unit.
The corporate IS directors and CIO also anticipated that this change would help to eliminate the
"difference in expectations" between IS and business units: "customer expectations" were higher
than IS, it was felt, because IS managers "know more about IT." That is, under decentralization,
"users realize that jobs are bigger than they seemed."
Company F's organization charts reflected the matrix design of these integrator roles: a solid-
line report to the business unit, dotted-line to the CIO. The new IS directors in the divisions were
actually viewed as having a striped-line (or "close" dotted-line) reporting relationship to the CIO,
14 When systems maintenance responsibilities were accepted by decentralized IS units that previously only did new
development, the IS managers of these units were elevated to the director level. When systems development (and
maintenance) responsibilities were newly decentralized to the corporate finance and human resource departments,
the heads of these new IS units were also positioned at the director level. In total, this resulted in six new IS director
positions within the divisions.
31
and were expected to have "two allegiances." One decentralized IS director who had recently
been promoted from a business management position referred to operating under two bosses--
with 60% "loyalty" to the business unit, and 40% to corporate IS.
In order to help coordinate activities between corporate IS and the divisional IS units, several
corporate IS oversight roles had also recently been implemented. New corporate positions with
responsibilities for global IS planning and centrally coordinated data administration had been
implemented. Corporate IS had also taken a more active role in standard-setting for the
acquisition of IT products and services purchased by IS units in the divisions: although there was
a "reasonable amount of connectivity" in place, corporate IS wasn't "waiting" for new technology
requests to promote integration. Centrally coordinated standards and training in "consensed"
systems development methodologies and CASE tools had also recently been put in place.
Category #3: Informal Networking Practices
One of Company F's published "core values" was the nurturing of its human resources, and
training & development interdepartmental events were regularly offered by the HR department,
the divisions, and corporate IS. Corporate IS offered technology training & development for
both corporate and decentralized IS professionals.
The corporate and division IS managers were connected via an IT network with mainframe E-
mail services. Increased globalization was a corporate initiative, but global
connectivity at the workstation level had not yet been realized.
Category #4: Cross-Unit Human Resource Practices
Several corporate HR practices regardingjob rotations were in place, resulting in frequent
movement between IS and non-IS assignments, and between corporate IS and division IS
assignments. First, cross-functional moves were explicitly encouraged as a way of nurturing
employees. The high value placed on "striking a balance between industry and technical
concerns" by corporate IS management was also signaled by the significant non-IS experience of
recently promoted IS executives; the CIO and most of the eleven U.S.-based directors had served
in company positions outside of the IS organization. Second, frequent job moves were formally
encouraged for high-performing managers, including IS professionals. The "movement of
people" was viewed as a "part of linkage," and job moves every eighteen to twenty-four months
were not uncommon. The typical IS manager had strong cross-functional, interpersonal networks
due to these rotation policies.
Performance appraisals for professional and managerial employees typically included cross-unit
sources of input, as well as input from personnel outside of the direct reporting hierarchy. For
the position of systems analyst, for example, at least one "outside" person would be included in
the appraisal process; for IS manager positions, the evaluation process included input from
several non-IS sources. This HR practice therefore incorporated Company F's core values on
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Table 2: Mechanisms for Corporate/Division Coordination of the IS Function
Category #1: Forntal Groups
Type la: Steering Committees
Type Ib: IS Standing Teams
Category #2: Formal Roles
Type 2a: Cross-Unit Integrators
Type 2b: Corporate IS Oversight Roles
Category #3: Informal Networking Practices
Type 3a: Physical Co-location
Type 3b: Interdepartmental Events
Type 3c: IT Networks
Category #4: Cross-Unit Hunian Resource Practices
Type 4a: Job Rotations
Type 4b: Input to Performance Reviews
Table 3: Managers Interviewed by Company and Position
Company Company
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